MSOM
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Vol. 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 273-291
DOI: 10.1287/msom.1060.0108
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Zhang, F.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

Competition, Cooperation, and Information Sharing in a Two-Echelon Assembly System

Fuqiang Zhang

Paul Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, California 92697-3125
fzhang{at}uci.edu

This paper studies a two-echelon assembly system and explores several important issues in managing decentralized supply chains. First, we investigate the behavior of the assembly system under decentralized control. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of the competitive assembly system exists but is never system optimal. Next, we examine the role of information in the assembly system. We consider horizontal information sharing on the inventory status between the suppliers and demonstrate when information is valuable from the perspectives of the system and the individual player. We find that information sharing mitigates the system’s competition penalty in some cases, but there are also instances in which information sharing can hurt a decentralized system. Although the manufacturer always prefers information sharing, it is sometimes in the interest of the suppliers to refuse to share information. Finally, we propose a demand-independent coordination scheme for managing decentralized supply chains with either a serial or an assembly structure. The coordination scheme has practical value because very often the firm’s head (or the owner of the supply chain) does not have the accurate demand information that the local managers have. Alternatively, the demand varies over time, and the coordination contracts have to be modified. Under the transfer payment contract, the system optimal policy is the unique Nash equilibrium in the decentralized supply chain. Discussion on the relationship between our coordination scheme and existing methods in the literature is also provided.

Key Words: assembly system; decentralization; information sharing; supply chain coordination
History: Received: March 31, 2004; accepted: February 7, 2006.




This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
MSOMHome page
L. Jiang and Y. Wang
Supplier Competition in Decentralized Assembly Systems with Price-Sensitive and Uncertain Demand
MSOM, January 1, 2010; 12(1): 93 - 101.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Management ScienceHome page
X. Fang, K. C. So, and Y. Wang
Component Procurement Strategies in Decentralized Assemble-to-Order Systems with Time-Dependent Pricing
Management Science, December 1, 2008; 54(12): 1997 - 2011.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Management ScienceHome page
H. Cavusoglu, H. Cavusoglu, and J. Zhang
Security Patch Management: Share the Burden or Share the Damage?
Management Science, April 1, 2008; 54(4): 657 - 670.
[Abstract] [PDF]




HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2006 by INFORMS.